Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 68
Issue 4 December

Article 16

Winter 1977

The Dynamics of Oscillatory Punishment
Processes
David F. Greenberg

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
David F. Greenberg, The Dynamics of Oscillatory Punishment Processes, 68 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 643 (1977)

This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Vol. 68, No. 4
Printed in U.S.A.

THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY

Copyright © 1977 by Northwestern University School of Law

CRIMINOLOGY
THE DYNAMICS OF OSCILLATORY PUNISHMENT PROCESSES*
DAVID F. GREENBERG**

In a recent paper, Blumstein, Cohen and
Nagin present two homeostatic models of the
imprisonment process inspired by Durkheim's
conception of society as a normatively integrated self-regulating mechanism.' Comparing
the imprisonment rates predicted by their
models with Canadian data for the period 19251960, the researchers found a good agreement
for one of their models. It is the purpose of
this paper to propose an alternative explanation of the observed imprisonment rates.
In both the models discussed by Blumstein et
al., the number of criminals at large in society
is regulated by the imprisonment of criminal
law violators. When the number of violators in
prison declines, the number at large increases.
Society then responds to this increase with
more incarcerations, thereby reducing the
number of criminals (and presumably the
amount of crime) present outside the prison
system. However, the two models differ in the
detailed assumptions made about the imprisonment process.
Both models generate second order autoregressive equations2 for the per capita imprisonment rt. These equations have the general form
rt

=

Aisrt-1 + 4)2rt-2 + 8' + Et,

(1)

where 411, 02s and 8' are constant coefficients, t
is the time, and the disturbance terms et are
assumed to be independently distributed.
* Research for this paper was conducted under a
grant from the Russell Sage Foundation. I am grateful to Daniel Nagin for a helpful conversation, and
to Jacquelyn Cohen for pointing out several errors
in an earlier version.
** Assistant Professor, Sociology Department,
New York University.
I Blumstein, Cohen & Nagin, The Dynamics of a
Homeostatic Punishment Process, 68 J. CRM. L. & C.
317 (1976).
2 An autoregressive equation is one in which the
dependent variable is regressed on its own earlier
variables.

When empirical values or plausible estimates
of the parameters of the two models are inserted into the expressions derived theoretically
for the coefficients, numerical predictions for
their values are obtained.
Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin find that the
model most consistent with the Canadian data
(their model II) yields the coefficients
01 = 1.31,

0P2 =

-0.43,

8' = 5.0 x 10-5,

in rather good agreement with the values
01 = 1.23,

2

=

-0.43,

8' = 9.17 x 10- 5

they obtain from a least squares fit to the
observed imprisonment rates.
Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin's work has major theoretical and practical implications. First,
Durkheim's belief that punitive justice
strengthens social cohesion by reinforcing the
collective conscience, although influential, has
rarely been empirically tested. Durkheim himself argued that it is primarily in societies characterized by mechanical solidarity that punishment serves this function; 3 since he believed
that society was evolving toward a division of
labor based on organic solidarity, it is unclear
that he would expect punishment to play a
major role in strengthening norms and preventing crime in the modern world. To be
sure, the model proposed by Blumstein et al.
does not depend entirely on the proposition
that collective acts of repression strengthen
norms; they allow for the possibility that legal
norms themselves may change. Nevertheless,
in finding support for the existence of a selfregulating mechanism, they do provide at least
partial confirmation of some of Durkheim's
ideas and more generally for a functionalist
theoretical orientation.
Second, Durkheim's writings on crime are
commonly taken as representing a "consensus
3 E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCI-

ETY

(G. Simpson trans. 1933).
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theory" approach to crime and law enforcement. It is norms that are widely shared by the
community that repression strengthens. Decades ago, George Herbert Mead pointed out4
that in a pluralistic society characterized by
normative dissensus, the enforcement of controversial rules might not have this effect at all.
By punishing actions thought by some significant group not to be wrong, the state would
tend to evoke resentment and hostility, weakening identification with the collectivity. To
the extent that inhibition against crime depends
on a sense of identification with rule-makers
and with potential victims, the enforcement of
some norms might increase rather than decrease the level of violations.
The Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin findings
suggest that the "Meadian conflict model" did
not operate in Canada during the years of
study and thus might be taken as confirming
the validity of a consensus perspective; however, the Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin model
[hereinafter cited as the BCN model] is capable
of accommodating some conflicting elements.
Blumstein et al. argue that when too large a
proportion of the population is imprisoned,
norms may change in such a way as to shift the
boundary between criminal and non-criminal
activities, with lesser offenses being decriminalized. This would reduce the number of criminals through a process of redefinition, rather
than repression. Class or interest group conflict
could play a role in the social process of redefinition. Blumstein et al. also argue that when
too few individuals are punished, "the basic
identifying values of the society will not be
adequately articulated and reinforced, again
leading to social instability" creating "pressures
for stricter law enforcement and perhaps more
severe punishments." 5 This pressure could as
easily come from particular groups in the society as from the society as a whole.
Implicit in the above quotation is the view
that the punishment of crime is a vital necessity
for society; if the number of individuals singled
out for punishment falls below some level,
"social instability" will result. The BCN model
thus seems to legitimate state punishment practices. It does, however, call into question some
widely held ideas about the effectiveness of
' Mead, The Psychology of PunitiveJustice, 23 AM. J.
Soc. 577 (1918).
' Blumstein, Cohen & Nagin, supra note 1, at 320.
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particular punishment practices. In the most
successful model, the size of the mean criminal
population is extraordinarily insensitive to the
recidivism rate, indicating that neither the rehabilitation nor the special deterrence of a
prison population roughly as large as is found
in Canada would have a substantial impact on
the crime rate. The size of the mean criminal
population also proves to be insensitive to wide
variation in the rate of admissions to and releases from prison, though the prison population is extremely sensitive to variations in these
parameters. The model is, however, consistent
with the possibility that enforcement makes a
contribution to conformity through its general
deterrent effect, though it does not provide
any information concerning the magnitude of
this contribution, if it exists.
Although the BCN model suggests that the
mean size of the criminal population is not
very responsive to short-run changes in policy
concerning prison admissions and releases, it
does attribute changes in the size of the criminal population at large to variation in the size
of the prison population. In this sense, the
model projects an air of complacency. On the
one hand, we do not need to be excessively
alarmed by increases in crime, because the
normal workings of popular pressure will bring
about corrective measures just as in the past;
extraordinary steps going beyond what has
been done in the past are not needed. On the
other hand, in the short-run it is primarily
through the state's punishment policies that the
number of criminals in society is regulated.
While it is consistent with the BCN model to
undertake other programs that might increase
the population's motivation to conform, that is
probably a long-term proposition, with little
immediate impact on either crime rates or
punishment levels.
Despite the elegance of the models that
Blumstein et al. present and the impressive
agreement between prediction and observation
that they find, final judgment as to the adequacy of their model must be reserved until
alternative models of the processes that generate imprisonment rates are 'examined. Such an
examination of one set of alternative models
will suggest the need to revise at least some
features of the BCN model.
Taken together, a set of assumptions about
releases and admissions comprise a model for

19771

OSCILLATORY PUNISHMENT PROCESSES

changes in the size of the prison population.
In examining alternative models, releases from
prison will first be considered, and then admissions will be considered.
Releasesfrom Prison
Pt, At and Rt represent, respectively, the
prison population the number of admissions to
prison and the number of releases from
prison at time t. Neglecting the small number
of inmate deaths, the change in prison population at time t equals the admissions at time t
less the releases at time t. Although time is a
continuous variable, data concerning prison
admissions and releases are available only in
aggregated form, as annual rates. This requires
that we make use of the discrete-time approximation
Pt -

t-1 --At - Rt,

(2)

where we have implicitly assumed that time is
measured in years.
The first assumption about releases we consider is that the number of prisoners released
is proportional to the prison population in any
given year. Thus, when the prison population
is high, the number of prisoners released will
be correspondingly high as well. This assumption can be expressed through the equation:
Pt - Pt- 1 = At - bPt.

Lagging the time by one year and taking the
difference between the above equation and the
lagged equation, we obtain the second order
difference equation:
Pt - 2Pt- 1 + Pt- 2 = At - At-, - b(Pt - Pt-,),
or
A

(2 + b) Pt- +

(I+b)

_At - At-,

1+b

1

(1 +b)-

Pt 2

tially at rate g, the transformation can be accomplished using the rules:
Pt = rtTt
Pt- 1 = (rt-1 - grt)Tt
2
Pt- 2 = (rt-2 - 2grt-1 + g rt)Tt

At = atTt
At-, = (at-, - ga7t)Tt.

These rules are valid to order g. As g for
Canada is approximately 0.02, terms of order
g2 can be omitted as negligible. We then find:
(2 +b +2g)
rtr1 + b + g(2 + b)}
1

{1 +b +g(2 +b)}rt

--at-,
+ {1at(1
+ b+ -g)g(2 + b)}"
Inserting observed values of b and g, we find:
02 = -0.65.
or = 1.64,
Since the predicted value of 01 lies outside the
ninety-nine percent confidence limits of its observed value, the model is clearly untenable.
As this model has not led to good predictions,
the assumption made about releases must be
modified. Instead of assuming that the number
of releases is proportional to the number of
prisoners, we assume that the lengths of the
sentences served in prison are geometrically
distributed. This means that of a cohort of
prisoners admitted at the same time, a fraction
a will be released after one year, a fraction a2
6
n
after two years, and a fraction ae after n years.
This approximates the observed distribution of
sentences, which is highly skewed. Many prisoners have sentences which are comparatively
short, with a small minority serving sentences
that are much longer.
With this assumption, equation (2) becomes:

Pt - Pt-i = At - aoAt-i - a 2At-2
-

3

(3)

During the period under study, the mean
sentence length was about two years which
corresponds to the value b = 1/2.
Next we transform equation (3), which relates prison populations and prison admissions,
to an equation for the per capita prison population rt and the per capita prison admission
rate at. Assuming with Blumstein, Cohen and
Nagin that the population Zt grows exponen-

-2

. . .
0aAt-n

•

(3)
•

Because the infinite series in the right hand
member is awkward to handle, it is best to
I In a continuous time model, the equivalent assumption would be that sentences are exponentially
distributed. See, e.g., Shinnar & Shinnar, The Effects
of the Criminal Justice System on the Control of Crime: A
QuantitativeApproach, 9 L. & Soc'v REV. 581 (1975).
In a study of prison sentences, a geometric distribution assumption may actually be better than an exponential distribution assumption because prison sentences are usually a year or more in length (in the
United States at least) and tend to cluster at the
integers (two years, three years etc.).
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eliminate it using a trick based on the Koyck
transformation for handling problems involving distributed lags in econometrics. The trick
consists of rewriting equation (3) with t replaced
by t - 1, and multiplying the result by the
quantity a. This gives us:
a(Pt-l - Pt- 2) =
aAt-1 -

(4)
2
C4At-2

..

anAt-n

Subtracting equation (4) from equation (3), we
find:

Pt - (1 + aX)Pt-1 + aPt- 2 = At - 2aAt- 1.

(5)

When written in terms of the per capita prison
population, this becomes
(1 + c + 2ag)
r,
1 +(1 +,)g r,-,
+

(1 + a)grr-2

(6)

= at(1 + 2aeg) - 2aat-i
1 + (1 + a)g
The quantity a can be estimated from the
mean sentence length S through the equation
S = a/(1 -

a) 2 .

During the period under study, the mean sentence length was approximately two years, corresponding to a = 1/2. Inserting this value and
the empirical value of g in equation (6), we
find:
0, = 1.48,

02

=

-0.48.

Although the value of tki just obtained is about
twenty percent higher than the observed value,
it does fall within the ninety percent confidence
limits for Ck.
It must be emphasized that these predictions
for 0,r and 0k 2 do not depend in any way on
assumptions concerning crime rates, recidivism
rates, or the rates at which individuals in the
population at large initiate or abandon criminal
activity. It has simply been assumed that sentence lengths decline geometrically, and that
the population grows slowly at an approximately constant rate.
As the Canadian population growth was indeed slow, and as the coefficients are insensitive
to the details of the growth pattern, a comparison of the model predictions with observation
is primarily a test of the assumption that sentence lengths decline geometrically. A discrep-
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ancy between observed and predicted values of
(A,and 0S 2 might, therefore, indicate little more
than a pattern of sentencing that deviates from
the pure geometric distribution assumed in the
model. 7 In any event, the reasonably good
agreement found in this model for the two
coefficients 'ki and 02 demonstrates that the
good agreement Blumstein et al. find in their
model for the same coefficients is not strong
evidence in favor of their model.
Any additional dynamic assumptions to be
incorporated in our model must take the form
of assumptions about the behavior of at, the
per capita rate of prison admissions. It is to
this topic that we turn next.
Commitments to Prison
Perhaps the simplest assumption that might
be made about commitments to prison is that
the per capita commitment rate fluctuates randomly about a constant level. With this assumption, we can write
at

a + vt,

(7)

where the vt are independently and identically
distributed with zero mean and constant variance, and a is a constant.
With this assumption, the right hand member of equation (6) becomes
a(1 + 2ag - 2a) + 11 + 2ag)vt-

1 + (1 + a)g
Substituting a =

'/2

2at-

I

1 + (1 + a)g
and g = 0.02, we find 8' =

0.02a. The average per capita rate of admissions to prison was approximately twenty per
100,000 per year; consequently the model predicts 8' = 0.4 x 10- 5. This is too small by a
factor of more than twenty.
This large discrepancy between predicted
7 It follows that a better fit for the coefficients rIl
and 02 can be obtained by slightly modifying the
assumptions made about sentences. For example, in
making the assumption that sentences are geometrically distributed, it is implicitly assumed that no
account is taken of the number of people in prison
when decisions are made about release. By assuming
that the release rate is increased when the prison
population is high, one additional parameter is added
to the model, and the fit for both coefficients is
improved. Some evidence for a departure from a
pure geometric distribution of sentences has been
found for a sample of prisoners drawn from five
California prisons. See J. Chaiken, Distribution of
Time Spent in Prison (1977) (unpublished Rand
Working Paper).

OSCILLATORY PUNISHMENT PROCESSES

19771

and observed value of 8' is not as alarming as it
appears. The prediction for 8' is quite sensitive
to the value of a. For example, if a = 0.45
instead of 0.50, we would predict 8' = 2.3 X
10- 5, which, though still too small, lies within
the ninety-five percent confidence limit for the
observed value. Secondly, the predicted value
for 8' depends strongly on the predicted values
for 01 and 42. Because the values we obtained
for these two parameters were slightly too large
in magnitude, we expect to find a value for 8'
that is somewhat too small.
To see this, we note that the solution to the
equation

correlation among the error terms from their
least squares fit.8
A consistent treatment of errors in the BCN
model, however, also leads to the conclusion
that the error terms should be negatively correlated, with a magnitude that depends on the
relative accuracy with which the model predicts
crime rates and imprisonment rates. As it is
not known how accurately their model predicts
crime rates, no precise prediction for the magnitude of autocorrelation in the error terms
can be made for their model. However, it is
possible to establish the limits
-6/13 < r,,, t-, < 0

rt = 0i/rt-, + 02rt-2 + 8'

for their model.
A more serious difficulty with the assumption
that admissions fluctuate randomly about a
constant level is that with coefficients 'P1 and 'P2
of the magnitude predicted by the "geometric
sentence" model, the solution will not be oscillatory. Yet a visual inspection of the annual
per capita prison populations suggests random
fluctuation about a sinusoidal oscillation. There
are two ways such oscillatory behavior can be
produced. One is through a self-regulating
process of the sort hypothesized by Blumstein,
Cohen and Nagin. Another way is for prison
admissions to be driven by a variable that is
exogenous to the crime-punishment system,
and which oscillates sinusoidally.
The distinction between these two possibilities can be clarified through the use of a physical analogy. Suppose I suspend a weight from
a spring in the presence of the earth's gravitational field, and let the weight and spring come
to equilibrium. If I then displace the weight,
stretching or compressing the spring, and
release it, the weight will bob up and down
without any further intervention on my part.
In the absence of friction, the weight will oscillate with a fixed amplitude and fixed frequency
indefinitely. Another way I can get the weight
to move in an oscillatory manner is by holding
it with my hand and moving my hand up' and
down.
The BCN model is somewhat analogous to
the first possibility, though the analogy is im-

can be written as the sum of any particular
solution to this equation, plus the general solution to the reduced equation obtained by setting
8' = 0. We can find a particular solution to the
above equation by letting rt = C, a constant.
We then find

8' = C(1 - 01 - 4 ).
C can be found by noting that when the general
solution to the reduced equation is oscillatory,
as it is in the BCN model II, the mean of the
general solution will be zero. Consequently, we
must have C = P, the mean value of the r t.
The prison population is thus predicted to
oscillate around a constant value.
Using the values of 0 and t2 that Blumstein
et al. obtained from their least squares analysis,
and noting that the mean incarceration rate
was roughly forty-six prisoners per 100,000
population, we find 8' = 9.2 x 10- 5 . In our
"geometric sentences" model, the coefficient 1
- cI1 - S62 vanishes (to within rounding error).
Consequently, the least squares value of 8'
computed under the constraint that the model's
predictions for 'P1 and 0P2 are correct would
lead to the value 8' = 0, which is much closer
to the model's prediction for the coefficient.
The assumption that the error terms in equation (7) are. statistically independent leads to
the prediction that there is first order serial
correlation among the error terms Et in equation (1), with
rtt

-1/2,

and vanishing serial correlations of higher order. This would appear to be a bad prediction,
as Blumstein et al. report finding no serial

8 It is possible that the stepwise estimation procedure adopted by Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin, in
which the autoregressive coefficients of the model
were estimated first and the error terms then examined for autocorrelation, led to an underestimation
of serial correlation among the error terms.
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perfect. Since changes in the criminal population at large are influenced by changes in the
prison population, and vice versa, the system
actually behaves like two coupled springs. However, the oscillatory movement of each variable
in the crime-punishment system arises from
the internal dynamics of the self-regulation.
The second possibility would constitute a mechanical analogue to the prison population if
there is some variable that causes prison admissions to oscillate in the same way that my hand
causes the weight to oscillate. To consider this
possibility we must see whether there are any
variables that might influence prison admissions and which also oscillate with an appropriate frequency.
There are many variables that might be expected to influence the rate of prison admissions, such as a community's demographic composition, the amount of resources it can expend
on punishment, the prevailing political sentiment, the crime rate and so on. Most such
variables change slowly and not necessarily in a
sinusoidal fashion. Whatever contribution they
might make to an explanation of the mean
level of a community's incarceration rate, they
would not cause that rate to oscillate. On the
other hand, those variables that characterize the
state of the business cycle do show the required
behavior, because periods of economic expansion alternate with periods of contraction in
capitalist economic systems.
Moreover, there are reasons to expect prison
admissions to depend strongly on the phase of
the business cycle. One reason is suggested by
microeconomic theory. When the economy is
in a period of contraction, unemployment rises.
Persons who are unemployed can be assumed
to have a greater incentive to steal than those
who are not. In addition, they may risk less
when they engage in crime, for they cannot
lose theirjobs if they are caught.9 If this reasoning is correct, crime rates will increase during
periods of unemployment. Assuming that the
probability of arrest, conviction and imprisonment following an offense remain unchanged,
more violators will be sentenced to prison during periods of high unemployment. It is also
possible that when the crime rate increases,
judges will respond to this increase by imposing
' See Ehrlich, Participationin Illegitimate Activities: A
Theoreticaland EmpiricalInvestigation, 81 J. POL. ECON.

521 (1973).
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prison sentences more frequently, in the hope
that this will help to reduce the crime rate.
Another reason prison admissions might be
expected to vary with the business cycle is
suggested by Rusche and Kirchheimer, 10 whose
historical survey of punishment practices suggest that long-term changes in the form and
intensity of state-imposed punishment reflect
the supply and demand of labor. When the
supply of labor is high relative to demand, this
perspective would suggest that the rate of imprisonment would be increased, with the goal
of taking excess labor off the market.
These arguments suggest that of the many
indices that might be used to measure the
phase of the business cycle, unemployment is
likely to be superior to others (e.g., the gross
national product or aggregate investment). We
therefore take the unemployment rate as an
indicator of the state of the economy. For the
period 1945-1959, we find that the correlation
between per capita admissions to prison and
the proportion of the labor force seeking employment is r = 0.92; this strongly confirms the
hypothesis." When the period is extended back
to 1938, the earliest year for which the relevant
data are available, the correlation is still positive
but not as strong; apparently the relationship
is distorted by the Depression and War years.
As can be seen from inspection of Figure 1,
which shows both prison admission rates and
unemployment rates for the years 1945-1959,
the high correlation between unemployment
and commitments to prison is not a trend
effect, created by causally unrelated monotonic
increases or decreases in both variables. Both
rates move up and down, prison commitments
following changes in unemployment quite
closely, with some evidence of prison admissions lagging a bit behind unemployment. This
may be a consequence of court delay.
A similar relationship has been shown to
hold for prison admissions in the United States;
for the period 1960-1972, the correlation between the unemployment rate and the rate of
first admissions to federal prison was 0.91, and
for first admissions to state prison, 0.86.12
'0 G.

RUSCHE & 0.

KIRCHHEIMER,

PUNISHMENT

(1939).
n Unemployment rates and prison admission rates
per population, for ages 16 and over, are taken from
M. URQUHART & K. BUCKLEY, HISTORICAL STATISTICS
OF CANADA 61, 644, 656 (1965). Data for more recent
years are not available.
12 See W. H. ROBINSON, P. SMITH & J. WOLF,
AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
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2.0

Unemployment
Rate
(in %)

Admissions
to Prison
per 10,000
population

1.8

1.6

FIGURE 1. Prison Admissions and Unemployment Rate in Canada, 1945-1959.

Again, this was not a trend effect; prison admissions rose and fell with the unemployment
rate.
For the Canadian data, the correlation between per capita prison population and the unemployment rate is also positive but considerably weaker than for per capita prison admissions (r = 0.28; when unemployment is lagged
by one year, r = 0.36). This is hardly surprising. When the mean sentence length is not
short as compared to the period of business
cycle, the prison population at a given time will
contain cohorts admitted at different stages of
the cycle. Also, each cohort will contain
prisoners with sentences of different lengths.
Both effects will tend to wipe out the population, partially obliterating the effect of unemployment.
Because of the moderately strong positive
first order autocorrelation arpong unemployment rates (rut ,u- 1 = 0.654), the serial correlation among the error terms of equation (1) will
be much smaller in this model than in the
random admissions model.
Having verified the existence of a strong
relationship between prison admissions and unPRISON POPULATIONS AND COSTSJECTIONS

To 1980 (1974).

ILLUSTRATIVE PRO-

employment, one may ask how this relationship
can be explained. In arguing that the prison
admission rate and the unemployment rate
might be related, we suggested several possible
causal processes that might lead to such a
relationship. One possibility involved a relationship between the crime rate and the unemployment rate. This model suggests that the
crime rate increases with the unemployment
rate. With constant conditional probabilities of
arrest and conviction, more offenders will be
brought into court and sentenced when unemployment is high, increasing the number of
admissions to prison. For more than a hundred
years, writers who analyzed the relationship
between crime and unemployment using data
on officially labeled offenders, have assumed
that this is the model they were testing.
If this "workload" model is correct, we
should find a high correlation between the
unemployment rate and the crime rate, a high
correlation between the crime rate and the
conviction rate, and a high correlation between
the conviction rate and the imprisonment rate.
The data necessary to test all these predictions
are not available. However, partial tests can be
carried out. Empirically, the correlation between the per capita rate of admissions to
prison and the per capita rate of convictions is

[Vol. 68
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approximately 0.01, in total disagreement with
the final prediction."3 High rates of commitment to prison during periods of unemployment thus cannot be explained as a passive
judicial response to a larger caseload.
Reported crime rates for the full range of
offenses are not available for Canada, but the
U.N. Demographic Yearbook does report annual
homicide rates for Canada. For the years 19531970, the correlation between the homicide rate
and the unemployment rate is 0.22. This is in
the predicted direction but not strong enough
to support the "workload" model.
We cannot fully test the hypothesis that
judges respond to perceptions of a higher
crime rate with increased sentences, but this
explanation is consistent with the observed correlations only if perceptions of the crime rate
are far more strongly related to the unemployment rate than to the reported crime rate, at
least to the extent that the homicide rate is an
index of the overall crime rate. We know too
little about perceptions of crime to fully assess
this possibility, but on the surface it appears
somewhat implausible.
Of course it may be that the homicide rate is
not a good index of the overall crime rate.
Homicide occurs infrequently by comparison
with theft offenses, and may be more weakly
related to unemployment than the latter. If so,
the overall crime rate, for which we have no
data, may be more strongly related to unemployment than the homicide rate, for which
the correlation is small.
The American data, however, suggest that
prison sentences may not be closely related to
perceived crime rates. During the mid to late
1960's, a period of economic expansion, crime
rates and arrest rates rose. Since increased
crime rates were the subject of extensive public
discussion and figured in national political campaigns, it is likely that judges were aware of
this increase. Yet admissions to prison declined
during this period. With the recession of the
early 1970's, crime rates continued to rise, but
no more rapidly than before, and prison commitments increased dramatically.
It thus appears that in both Canada and the
United States, changes in commitments to
prison can be explained almost entirely by
changes in the unemployment rate. Changes
in the number of cases entering the criminal
Annual conviction rates are reported in M.
QUHART & K. BUCKLEY, supra note 11, at 643.
13

UR-

justice system and potentially available for imprisonment seem to be unimportant, as does
the crime rate, at least as far as we can measure
it.
Rusche and Kirchheimer's proposal that
penal policies are governed by labor market
considerations irrespective of the problems
crime poses for society is not contradicted by
the data, but nevertheless seems implausible
for the period under consideration, for it requires that we assume that Canadian and
American judges, almost without exception,
orient their sentencing policies to the requirements of the labor market and that they agree
on how this can best be done. For the present
period, this assumption is farfetched. Perhaps
the absolute monarchs of seventeenth century
Europe could instruct judges to commute sentences in order to obtain galley slaves, 14 but
neither the prime minister of Canada nor the
president of the United States exercises comparable authority over sentencing.
For the present era, it is more plausible to
assume that judges are less willing to grant
probation to offenders when they are unemployed, or that unemployment affects levels of
community tolerance toward offenders, to
which judges respond in sentencing. The data
needed to determine whether this speculation
has merit are unfortunately not at hand.
DISCUSSION

We have shown that a model in which prison
sentences are geometrically distributed, and in
which admissions to prison are governed by
the unemployment rate, fares reasonably well
when compared with a least squares fit to a
second order autoregressive equation for the
per capita imprisonment rates. As the difference equation predicted by the model is not of
precisely the same form as the one for which
the least squares fit was obtained (because the
model involves a time-dependent driving
term), the comparison must be taken as merely
suggestive."5
It follows from the analysis presented here
that the testing of a model that contains assumptions about admissions and releases from
prison must be undertaken with caution. In
14

See

G.

RUSCHE &

0.

KIRCHHEIMER, supra

note

10, at 53-71.
13 This reservation does not apply to our findings
concerning the relationship between unemployment

and prison admissions.
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the models presented here, separate tests of
the assumptions made about releases and admissions were possible. However, the test of
the assumptions made about releases was not
as strong as it would have been possible had
detailed information about the distribution of
sentence lengths been available.
In the BCN models, separate tests of the
various model assumptions are less easily performed. BIumstein, Cohen and Nagin's best
model does lead to good predictions for the
coefficients of equation (1), but as we have
seen, this may be true of alternative models as
well. A stronger test would involve. a comparison of crime rates and imprisonments with
those predicted by the model.
Unfortunately, annual crime rates do not
appear to be available for Canada for the years
in question. However, the analysis of prison
admissions presented here does cast doubt on
the validity of the assumptions made in the
BCN model about the admissions process. We
find that whatever effect punishment may have
on crime, oscillations in the rate of admissions
to prison in Canada in recent years have been
governed almost entirely by changes in the
unemployment rate. The same relationship appears to hold in the United States as well. In
light of this cross-national similarity, further
investigation to determine whether the same
pattern is found in other nations appears warranted.
The relationship between unemployment
and admissions to prison discovered here is of
particular interest in connection with the labeling perspective in deviance theory, which has,
among other things, directed attention to the
role of extra-legal contingencies in criminal
justice dispositions. For the most part, attention
has focused on the effect of individual offenders' extra-legal attributes on the dispositions
they receive. However, extra-legal considerations may also influence the dispositions received by offenders collectively. In the short
run, it appears that economic considerations
have an important bearing on the likelihood
that someone who has been convicted will be
sentenced to prison or will receive a non-prison
disposition.
Our findings have implications for reformers
who seek to reduce prison populations. In
recent years, reformers have sought to "divert"
offenders from prison by creating "alternative"
dispositions, not involving incarceration. Yet

in recent years, prison populations have risen
to historically unprecedented levels. Moreover,
accumulating evidence suggests that many of
those sentenced to diversion programs would
not have been sentenced to prison in the absence of diversion programs. Instead, their
cases would have been dismissed, or they would
have been granted probation. It thus appears
that the development of diversion programs
may be an ineffective way of changing the size
of the prison population. Although we are not
accustomed to thinking about the manipulation
of the state's fiscal and monetary policies as a
way of influencing judicial sentencing patterns,
such an approach might prove more effective
than strategies now being employed, if it could
be implemented.
The major difficulty here will be the obvious
fact that levels of employment are governed by
other considerations besides penal policy. Corporations make investment decisions on the
basis of profit considerations, and federal policies.that impact on unemployment take into
account the needs of continued capital accumulation, the balance-of-payments problem,
the exigencies of election year politics and so
on. These are problems that surely carry much
greater weight with policy-makers than considerations of penal policy.
The counterposing of "conflict theory" and
"consensus theory" approaches to criminology
has often been framed as if the crucial question
at issue was whether the population was united
or divided on such matters as the substantive
content of the criminal law and the appropriate
methods of enforcement. Notwithstanding
such issues, the analysis presented here shows
that conflict theory may be relevant to an
understanding of the criminal justice system in
another way. High levels of employment function to reduce income to the working class and
prevent rising wages because of eroding business profits,'1 6 and the business cycle which
plays such a large role in determining the rate
of admissions to prison is a feature of capitalist
economic systems, that is, of a particular kind
of class system. Moreover, the bulk of the
prison population is drawn from the working
class. Thus, the notions of class and class conflict are directly relevant to an understanding
of the functioning of the prison system.
16 Boddy & Crotty, Class Conflict and Macro-Policy:
The Political Business Cycle, 7 REV. RADICAL POL.

EcoN. 1 (1975).

